

Article on Navy

Theme - The Navy has two combat missions--projecting power ashore and sea control. The latter is the fundamental of the two. It has been neglected in US naval strategy and force planning but will become the Navy's primary focus if war with the Soviet Union breaks out.

I. Mahan

In 18____, A. T. Mahan wrote, "The influence of Sea Power on History." This work was a historical analysis of British use of sea power in the ____ and ____ centuries. It was instantly viewed as a justification for navies; and that use has persisted.

II. The Mahanian Theses

Sea power is the necessary concomitant of trade and hence of economic growth of trading nations. Sea power requires a network of bases and a fleet of such strength as to dissuade an opponent from challenging at sea; hence a capability to defeat an enemy battle fleet.

III. Validity of the Theses

As a historical analysis - valid.

As a proscription for the next century - increasingly invalid with time:

- A. Advent of the submarine - battle fleets no longer were the sole determinant of use of the seas by merchant ships.
- B. Advent of the military aircraft - battle fleets were even less the determinant of sea control.

- C. Advent of wider and more rapid communications and regard for international law - the threat of blockade or interference with merchant shipping became less credible.

IV. Why does the myth prevail?

A. Originally:

Kaiser

T. Roos

Both were looking for a rationale for expansionism--colonialism.

- B. General - suited the economic and political philosophies of the nations that were potential sea powers.

- C. Fascination with combat vehicle.

The vehicle of war is designed to defeat the like vehicle of war.

Galley vs. galley

Cross bowman vs. cross bowman

Tank vs. tank

BB vs. BB

For the gladiator the chariot becomes an entity unto itself, not just a means to an end.

Common failing of military mentality is to lose sight of the end objective.

Common tendency of military is to continue to develop the vehicle well beyond its usefulness.

- D. Fascination with the "offense"

War is a masculine profession.

Battle fleets on offense, seeking out and destroying enemy, are epitome.

Mahan's philosophy epitomized offense.

E. Budget justification.

Armies are relatively easy to justify - only their size and shape at issue.

Navies are more remote and have limited political usefulness.

Once Mahan provided a winning justification - why change?

Today the offense is considered part of justification
defense does not connote sufficient usefulness.

F. Dearth of naval strategists.

Military profession does not generate intellectuals easily;
but armies more than navies -

Who are the strategic writers?

Clausewitz

Mahan

Mackinder

Corbett

Perhaps it's the very remoteness of naval operations from
political objectives that discourages naval officers
from intellectualizing.

V. What should the new strategy be?

A. Naval contribution to defense of vital national interests must
be first concern.

1. Most likely and threatening is a war with Soviet Union.

a. Capability to project power with strategic nuclear
weapons is first priority -

- b. Beyond that sea control of SLOC to area of conflict is next because:
 - (1) War cannot be sustained beyond our shores w/o sea control.
 - (2) Potential contribution of projection of power forces is limited in a major war.
- c. Sustaining war necessary?
 - (1) World Wars I and II hung in balance of sea control.
 - (a) Neither Kaiser nor Hitler prepared for interdiction campaign.
 - 1. Battle of Jutland preparation by both sides--inconclusive.
 - 2. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck prep Hitler - 25(?) subs
Doenitz plea(?)
 - (b) On outbreak of each war Germans turned immediately to sub warfare.
 - (2) Today not appear Sov have intent to interdict.
 - (a) Do have capability.
(Compare with Hitler's)
 - (3) Concept that SLOC not necessary to such a war.
 - (a) Short war view
May be short but one important factor in that determination would be whether both sides could sustain conflict.
 - (b) Airlift view

(Statistics)

d. Limitations of projection.

(1) Airpower

(a) Allied a/c inventory in Europe is ____;
compares with ____ attack and ____ fighter
a/c on entire 6 CVs in Atlantic (and much
of VF and some VA must be retained for
defense of CV)

(2) Amphib - short of a Normandy not very important
due lack landing beaches.

(a) Considerable time to mount even division
scale assault--sea control essential to
move it.

(3) Risks - 4 CV needed to survive in heavily
contested environments where projection would
take place. CV is heart of sea control capability,
too. Could not risk 1/3 CV force in return for
limited # VA sorties or small scale amphib assault.

e. Sea control strategy

(1) No matter what US planning is; no matter how Sov
use their navy in beginning, US strategists are
bound to react in same way.

(a) Preserve our capability to fulfill the ultimate
need should it arise - protection of SLOC in
protracted conventional war.

(b) Could not afford to do otherwise short of a
true emergency requirement, e.g., devastating
blow to land based air power in Europe.

B. Contribution to less critical national requirements.

1. Non-Soviet wars

- a. Generally projection of power is requirement;
perhaps local area sea control (new weaponry)

- (1) Premium on speed of response more than quantity
of air strike/amphib assault.

2. Peacetime show of force

- a. Threat of projection of power; or blockade/sea denial.
- b. Right place at right time premium.
- c. Summary

USN strategy today requires mix of sea control and power projection. Problem is to determine proportionate emphasis and readiness and where, with limited resources, one vehicle or weapons system can fulfill both roles.

VI. What is the Soviet strategy?

A. Evolution of past 35 years

- 1. Gorskov the leader for ____ years -- has lent singleness of purpose
- 2. Original emphasis on subs - ideal sea denial weapon
 - a. Defense of homeland always high on Sov list
 - (1) CVs clearly a threat
- 3. Cruise missile on subs and surface ships extended sea denial possibilities
 - a. Buildup of surface navy

4. 1/2 Backfire production dedicated to Navy -
again sea denial role
 5. Combination of forces has led to a gradually expanding
sea control zone as well as sea denial expansion.
 6. Peacetime show of force exploited increasingly.
 7. Gradual evolution of:
 - a. Unrep
 - b. Amphib
- B. Direction for future?
1. Gorskov thesis: only if subs supported by air and surface
ships can be effective - coordinated operations necessary -
Hitler's failure
 - a. Presumably sea control concept
 - b. Moskva, then Kiev and possibly CV are indicative
of intent to operate in coordinated tactics outside
range of land-based air.
 - (1) Gorskov may well view sea denial in Atlantic
SLOC as unachievable by subs alone. In effect
must have sea control of surface, too, to be
effective.
 - (2) If so, may be building step by step toward an
open ocean sea denial/sea control capability based
on subs, surface combatants and sea-based air.

- (3) Edging sea control zone outward - knowing that to move out from under land-based air umbrella is a giant step - but the end objective.

VII. Optimizing the US Navy to its strategy

A. Understanding sea control

1. Four tactics against 3 threats: air, sub, surface
 - a. Destroy at base
 - b. Blockade
 - c. Barrier interdiction
 - d. Point defense
2. Nature of all four tactics has changed due:
 - a. Increased range of weapons
 - b. Greater accuracy of weapons
 - c. Longer range detection
3. Impact of changed nature of warfare on each tactic:
 - a. Destroy at base: More difficult to penetrate and sea-based air always at a range disadvantage; but greater destructiveness and accuracy if do penetrate.
 - b. Blockade: Difficult to do with air; requires such close in action against ships and subs that only subs can attempt; technical trends are against them as Soviet sea control areas expand.

- c. Barriers: Requires sea-based air for air or ships; probably even for subs.
- d. Point defense: must extend 3 dimensional defensive perimeter even further; requires air for rapid attack and for elevating sensors.

B. Understanding Projection of Power Ashore

1. 3 Tactics

- a. Air strike
- b. Amphib assault
- c. Gun/missile bombardment

2. Nature of tactics has changed due to same characteristics of weapons and sensors. Impact on projection tactics:

- a. Air strike - air defense weapons require stand-off attacks; more accurate weapons reduce tonnage required per destruction.
- b. Amphib - small, mobile, defensive weapons make large assaults more difficult, including vulnerability of only new tactic since WW II, helo assault.
- c. Bombardment - missiles may open up new possibilities, especially when consider in connection with required stand-off for aircraft.

C. Understanding interplay of sea control and power projection

- 1. Clearly sea control is sine qua non for projection.

2. Destroy at base tactic for sea control smacks of power projection. Distinction is only in purpose--to destroy elements contributing to enemy's sea denial capability or to destroy elements related to air or land campaigns or industrial or social strength. Importance of distinction lies in more limited nature of requirements for sea control, e.g., inland penetration not so deep, target complexes more limited, types of weapons, e.g., mines, may be different, etc. In short, the full panoply of power projection is not a sine qua non of sea control; only a limited application of power projection tactics to the sea control mission.

- VIII. What kind of a Navy is required to fulfill this strategy?
- IX. What is U.S. naval strategy today?
- X. Why is strategy not coherent?

Tape 7

Side A, 3 1/8 - 3 3/16

24 AUG 1979

FOR THE CALENDAR:

Note that I have two tickets to the Redskins-Bengals football game on December 9th. Brunch at the Metropolitan Club at 11:00 and bus at 12:00 to the game. I'll have to invite someone else to go with me.

S T

STAT

cc:



T - 1 Nov

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE I-16

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 August 1979

NEW OVERT CIA BUYS 'HELP WANTED' AD

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Central Intelligence Agency may try to keep its activities secret, but it has taken a more open approach to recruiting.

The CIA Sunday took out a large display ad in the Washington Post in the "professional opportunities" section of the classified ads, seeking applications for "special men and women who still have a spirit of adventure."

Reminding everyone the agency is an "equal opportunity" employer, the ad uses the slogan "It's time for us to know more about each other."

The ad did not specify which jobs the agency was trying to fill, but its wording appeared aimed at attracting applicants who might be interested in some of the CIA's more covert posts.

"There aren't many of you. One in a thousand, maybe. You're a bright, self-reliant, self-motivated person we need to help us gather information and put together a meaningful picture of what's happening in the world," the ad said. "You can rely on your wits, your initiative and your skills. And, in return, enjoy recognition, positions of responsibility, life in foreign places, plus knowing that you belong to a very small, very special group of people doing a vital, meaningful job in the face of challenges and possible hardship."


The ad specifies it is looking only for college graduates who are American citizens and have foreign language aptitude.

To the Special Events Committee:

XX I accept the two football package tickets
for the game scheduled on DEC 9 1979.

 I cannot accept.

I realize that cancellations will be accepted
only if the club can resell the football tickets.



Member's signature

*card mailed
24 Aug mjs*

24 August 1979

REMINDER MEMO

1. Start three pilot projects to demonstrate our ability to provide better support to the military. Pick areas in which we have real expertise and the military has a need.
 - a. Pick one for each of the three military services.
 - b. Pick one that has to do with an R&D decision.
 - c. Pick one that has to do with a procurement decision.
 - d. Pick one that has to do with a tactical situation.
2. Use these to demonstrate that we can do more, particularly if we are allowed to share information on forces and weapons.